"C'est en 2010 que le doyen Alassane Ndaw me confia l'édition d'un recueil de ses textes incluant des articles déjà publiés ainsi que des inédits. Il me demanda expressément de rédiger, à cet effet, outre une introduction, une préface, et m'assura que j'avais toute liberté de conduire le travail éditorial. L'ouvrage, Penser l'Afrique noire, se présente donc comme un ensemble de quatorze textes déjà publiés ou inédits, auxquels s'ajoute un quinzième constituant l'épilogue qui fut à l'origine une magistrale (...) préface de Ndaw au beau livre d'art d'Olivier Föllimi, Hommage l'Afrique (Paris, Editions de la Martinière, 2010, 336 p.). Toute sa vie, Alassane Ndaw a poursuivi une seule idée, un seul objectif : établir une puissante synthèse entre tradition et modernité, entre pensée africaine et philosophie occidentale, en vue d'aboutir à la définition d'une personnalité culturelle capable, en surmontant tout déchirement, de se remembrer. Il cherchait moins une philosophie africaine qu'une forme africaine de la philosophie. L'élaboration de cette forme africaine de la philosophie lui apparaissait comme la tâche par excellence de l'herméneutique, qu'il fallait d'abord créer. Aussi bien s'était-il constamment attelé à deux activités majeures : expliciter et interpréter les traditions culturelles africaines, c'est-à-dire créer l'herméneutique africaine en la faisant. De la permanence de cette tâche, en même temps que de son actualité, témoigne cet ouvrage posthume de ce grand maître de la pensée africaine. " Djibril Samb. (shrink)

Comment redonner aux élèves l'amour de la réflexion philosophique? Ce document tente de répondre à cette question : son objectif principal est d'inciter nos apprenants à lire et à écrire. Pour ce faire, on a voulu, par une série d'exercices schématisés et d'exemples simples, mettre à l'épreuve l'expression et la faculté d'argumentation des candidats au bac. Disserter, c'est avant tout faire valoir deux aptitudes : savoir lire et écrire. Savoir lire, parce que la dissertation exige un effort de décodage ou (...) de décryptage d'un message que véhicule une affirmation ou une question. Savoir écrire, parce qu'elle requiert l'argumentation, la conceptualisation, l'expression correcte et la présentation ordonnée des idées. Les candidats trouveront ici une propédeutique simple à la dissertation en participant à une réflexion ébauchée, mais inachevée portant sur des sujets afférents aux différents thèmes du programme. Commenter un texte philosophique, c'est avant tout dialoguer avec un auteur par-delà les barrières que sont l'espace et le temps. On ne peut s'initier à la philosophie qu'en apprenant à soutenir un débat contradictoire avec des auteurs. Si, comme dit Kant, on n'apprend guère la philosophie ; on ne peut qu'apprendre à philosopher, alors la voie royale du "philosopher" c'est la fréquentation assidue des textes philosophiques. Des textes, des schémas de commentaire ainsi que des exemples complets de commentaires proposés ici devraient aider le candidat à affiner sa capacité de communication et d'élaboration conceptuelle. (shrink)

The Rift Valley fever (RVF), which first appeared in Kenya in 1912, is an anthropozoonosis widespread in tropical areas. In Senegal, it is particularly felt in the Ferlo area where a strong presence of ponds shared by humans, cattle and vectors is noted. As part of the studies carried out on the environmental factors which favour its start and propagation, the focus of this paper is put on the decision making process to evaluate the impacts, the interactions and to make (...) RVF monitoring easier. The present paper proposes a model based on data mining techniques and dedicated to trade experts. This model integrates all the involved data and the results of the analyses made on the characteristics of the surrounding ponds. This approach presents some advantage in revealing the relationship between environmental factors and RVF transmission vectors for space–time epidemiology monitoring purpose. (shrink)

BackgroundObtaining informed consent for participation in genomic research in low-income settings presents specific ethical issues requiring attention. These include the challenges that arise when providing information about unfamiliar and technical research methods, the implications of complicated infrastructure and data sharing requirements, and the potential consequences of future research with samples and data. This study investigated researchers’ and participants’ parents’ experiences of a consent process and understandings of a genome-wide association study of malaria involving children aged five and under in Mali. (...) It aimed to inform best practices in recruiting participants into genomic research.MethodsA qualitative rapid ethical assessment was undertaken. Fifty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted with the parents of research participants. An additional nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior research scientists, research assistants and with a member of an ethics committee. A focus group with five parents of research participants and direct observations of four consent processes were also conducted. French and translated English transcripts were descriptively and thematically coded using OpenCode software.ResultsParticipants’ parents in the MalariaGEN study had differing understandings of the causes of malaria, the rationale for collecting blood samples, the purposes of the study and the kinds of information the study would generate. Genomic aspects of the research, including the gene/environment interaction underlying susceptibility or resistance to severe malaria, proved particularly challenging to explain and understand.ConclusionsThis study identifies a number of areas to be addressed in the design of consent processes for genomic research, some of which require careful ethical analysis. These include determining how much information should be provided about differing aspects of the research and how best to promote understandings of genomic research. We conclude that it is important to build capacity in the design and conduct of effective and appropriate consent processes for genomic research in low and middle-income settings. Additionally, consideration should be given to the role of review committees and community consultation activities in protecting the interests of participants in genomic research. (shrink)

Background: As actors with the key responsibility for the protection of human research participants, Research Ethics Committees (RECs) need to be competent and well-resourced in order to fulfil their roles. Despite recent programs designed to strengthen RECs in Africa, much more needs to be accomplished before these committees can function optimally.Objective: To assess training needs for biomedical research ethics evaluation among targeted countries.Methods: Members of RECs operating in three targeted African countries were surveyed between August and November 2007. Before implementing (...) the survey, ethical approvals were obtained from RECs in Switzerland, Cameroon, Mali and Tanzania. Data were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire in English and in French.Results: A total of 74 respondents participated in the study. The participation rate was 68%. Seventy one percent of respondents reported having received some training in research ethics evaluation. This training was given by national institutions (31%) and international institutions (69%). Researchers and REC members were ranked as the top target audiences to be trained. Of 32 topics, the top five training priorities were: basic ethical principles, coverage of applicable laws and regulations, how to conduct ethics review, evaluating informed consent processes and the role of the REC.Conclusion: Although the majority of REC members in the targeted African countries had received training in ethics, they expressed a need for additional training. The results of this survey have been used to design a training program in research ethics evaluation that meets this need. (shrink)

This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.

This paper investigates forms of metaphysical vertigo that can appear when contrasts between humans and animals are challenged. Distinguishing three forms of vertigo and four ways of differentiating humans and animals, the paper attempts to achieve a perspicuous representation of what could be termed “the difficulty of being humans when we are animals”; or alternatively, “the difficulty of being animals when we are humans”.

A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to undergo. This chapter focuses on three issues concerning such experiences. The first issue is the so-called ‘transparency’ of experiences. The chapter distinguishes a number of different interpretations of the suggestion that visual experiences are ‘transparent’. It then discusses in what sense, if any, visual experiences are ‘transparent’, and what further conclusions one can draw from that. The second issue is which properties we are (...) presented with in visual experiences. It is widely accepted that we sometimes experience red for example. But exactly which properties do we sometimes visually experience, and which properties do we never visually experience? The third issue is which particulars, if any, we are presented with in visual experiences. Do we for example sometimes visually experience mind-independent particulars like trees? Do we sometimes visually experience mind-dependent, particular ‘sense-data’? (shrink)

It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...) the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess "phenomenal concepts" of our conscious states. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a 3D-individual-based model to understand effect of various small-scale mechanisms in phytoplankton cells, on the cellular aggregation process. These mechanisms are: spatial interactions between cells due to their chemosensory abilities, a molecular diffusion and a demographical process. The latter is considered as a branching process with a density-dependent death rate to take into account the local competition on resources. We implement the IBM and simulate various scenarios under real parameter values for phytoplankton cells. To quantify (...) the effects of the different processes quoted above on the spatial and temporal distribution of phytoplankton, we used two spatial statistics: the Clark–Evans index and the group belonging percentage. Our simulation study highlights the role of the branching process with a weak-to-medium competition in reinforcing the aggregating structure that forms from attraction mechanisms, and shows by contrast that aggregations cannot form when competition is high. (shrink)

According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” or “crazy”. A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason (...) to accept it, why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy”, which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the “error explanation” is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...) can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim. (shrink)

RésuméContrairement à ce que pourrait donner à penser la these de E. Mayr sur ľimportance actuelle des explications évolutives en biologie, par opposition aux explications fonctionnelles, ľauteur soutient que, pour ľépistémologie de la causalité, le second type ?on;explication reste plus significatif que le premier. II tente de le montrer en reprenant brièvement son analyse des travaux de P.E. Pilet sur les inhibiteurs de croissance , telle qu'elle a ete présentée dans quatre articles antérieurs.SummaryStarting from E. Mayr's distinction between functional and (...) evolutionary explanation, the author suggests that, as far as the epistemological analysis of causality is concerned, the former type of explanation remains of more interest than the latter. He illustrates this claim by briefly taking up his philosophical and logico‐linguistic study of P.E. Pilet's work on growth inhibitors in the field of plant growth regulation, which was presented in a series of four previous papers.ZusammenfassungVon E. Mayrs Unterscheidung zwischen funktionaler und evolutiver Erklärung ausgehend, weist der Autor nach, dass die erste Art der Erklärung in bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse der Kansalität mehr Bedeutung hat. Er versucht aufgrund seiner früheren Analysen von P.E. Pilets Schriften über Wachstumsinhibitoren auf dem Gebiet der Wachstumsregulation von Pflanzen diese Auffassung zu erhärten. (shrink)

RésuméOn examine ?on;abord les termes explicites et implicites du contrat de justice selon Rawls. Ensuite on rappelle ľinterprétation ‘procédurale’ que ce dernier donne de ľautonomie kantienne et ľon montre ľinanité de cette interprétation. Cependant la doctrine de Rawls exprime avec bon‐heur une conception sceptique de la justice.SummaryAfter a short examination of the explicit and implicit contract of justice according to Rawls, the reasons afforded by him to give a Kantian foundation to the contract are recalled and rebutted. However Rawls's doctrine (...) remarkably expresses the main argument of a sceptical conception of justice.ZusammenfassungNach einer kurzen Untersuchung des expliziten und impliziten Begriffs des Gesellschaftsver‐trages, wie Rawls ihn versteht, wird die besondere Interpretation erOrtert, die er vom Kantschen Autonomiebegriff gibt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese unzutreffend ist und dass Rawls Lehre eher auf eine skeptische Auffassung der Gerechtigkeit zutrifft. (shrink)

Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original orders and invented artifacts. The paper (...) scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers, such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior. (shrink)